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INDIAN LAW 
WATER, WATER EVERYWHERE: 
U.S. v. ADAIR KEEPS INDIAN RIGHTS 
IN FEDERAL COURT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Adair1 the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that federal court was the proper forum for adjudicat-
ing federally reserved water rights even though a state action 
was in progress on substantially the same issue.2 The court also 
determined the substantive water rights of the Klamath Indian 
Tribe and its members, of successors to Indian lands and of the 
federal government.3 
In 1975, the United States, on behalf of the Fish and Wild-
life Service and the Forest Service,· filed suit in U.S. District 
Court in Oregon against 600 private landowners for a declaration 
of the water rights on the former Klamath Indian Reservation.tI 
1. 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983); (per Fletcher, J.; the other panel members were 
Goodwin, J. and Kilkenny, J.) (as modified on denial of rehearing Jan. 24, 1984) cert. 
denied sub nom. Oregon v. United States, 52 U.S.L.W. 3906 (U.S. June 18, 1984) (No. 
83-1735). 
2. Pursuant to OR. REV. STATS. §§ 539.010-539.110 (1979), an administrative pro-
ceeding was initiated in January 1976 by the Water Resources Department to determine 
water rights in the Williamson River system. 723 F.2d at 1398-99. 
3. 723 F.2d at 1408-17. 
4. This is an unusual aspect of the case because the government usually represents 
the interests of the Indians in water rights suits. In this case, the government owned 
70 % of the former reservation land and represented the agencies in charge of those 
lands. 723 F.2d at 1398. Since the Tribe intervened, the conflict of interest issue was not 
raised. Id. at 1407. There was clearly potential conflict between government attorneys 
arguing on behalf of the agencies claiming as successors-in-interest and government at-
torneys representing the Tribe arguing for Indian interests. See Nevada v. United States, 
103 S.Ct. 2906, 2917 (1983) reh'g denied 104 S.Ct. 210 (1983). 
5. United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336 (D. Or. 1979). The Klamath Indian Res-
ervation had been terminated in 1961 pursuant to the Klamath Termination Act of 1954. 
25 U.S.C. §§ 564-564w (1982). The Act allowed tribal members to receive cash in ex-
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The district court held that under the terms of the treaty6 estab-
lishing the reservation the Klamath Tribe possessed reserved 
water rights for hunting and fishing with a priority date of time 
immemoriaF and water rights for irrigation with a priority date 
of 1864. Additionally, Indian allottees6 were entitled to water 
rights for irrigation with a priority date of 1864,9 subject to the 
hunting and fishing water rights. The court also held that non-
Indian successorslO were entitled to sufficient water to irrigate 
acreage actually being irrigated at the time titled passed as well 
as additional acreage subsequently placed under irrigation. The 
priority date for both uses was 1864.11 In addition, the district 
(1659 out of 2113 members, or 78% of the Tribe) the government sold a large portion of 
reservation lands. The government and private individuals purchased the lands. The bal-
ance of the land was placed in trust with a bank to be managed for the remaining mem-
bers of the Tribe. In 1958 the government purchased 15,000 acres of forest lands on the 
former reservation. This purchase extended the Winema National Forest adjacent to the 
reservation. Since 1893 the government had been withdrawing lands in that area from 
the public domain in order to establish a national forest. In 1973 the government con-
demned additional forest lands on the former reservation to add to the Forest. 478 F. 
Supp. at 340. In 1960 the government bought 15,000 acres of the Klamath Marsh, the 
heart of the former reservation, to establish a refuge to benefit migrating birds and other 
wildlife. In 1961 the government made additional purchases of land in order to pay mem-
bers of the Tribe. In 1973 most of the lands held in trust by the bank were condemned 
and the balance of the trust lands were sold to private individuals. Id. 
6. Treaty between the United States of America and the Klamath and Moadoc 
Tribes and the Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians, Oct. 14, 1864, 16 Stat. 707. Article I of 
the Treaty secured for the Indians the exclusive right to hunt and fish on the reserva-
tion. Id. 
7. Id. Article I recognized rights which predated the Treaty by over 1000 years, and 
therefore the correct priority date for water rights to support hunting and fishing rights 
was "time immemorial" rather than the date of the Treaty. 723 F.2d at 1412-14. 
8. "Allottees" refers to Indians who received parcels of land pursuant to the General 
Allotment (Dawes) Act. 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-411 (1976)). The pur-
pose of the Act was to convert Indians to an agricultural lifestyle by allotting parcels of 
reservation lands to heads of families. There was an initial trust period of up to 25 years 
during which the allottee could not alienate the lands. The Act succeeded in breaking up 
tribal lands through sales of non-allotted lands to non-Indians and sales and leases by 
allottees after they received title. At the time of the suit the former Klamath Reserva-
tion of 168,000 acres was in the hands of over 600 private landowners, many of whom 
were purchasers of allotments. 
9. The date of priority comes from the 1864 Treaty. 16 Stat. 707. The Indians ceded 
12 million acres to the United States government and agreed to reside permanently on 
168,000 acres. Under the reserved rights doctrine, the treaty date is the usual priority 
date for water rights for irrigation because one of the primary purposes of establishing 
Indian reservations was to encourage development of agriculture. See infra notes 37 and 
38. 
10. This group consisted of purchasers of Indian allotments and of Indian lands sold 
after termination. See supra notes 5 and 8. 
11. 478 F. Supp. at 349. 
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court held that it was unnecessary to separately determine the 
water rights of the federal government because they were coter-
minous with Indian rights. The State of Oregon and private 
landowners appealed and the Klamath Tribe cross-appealed.12 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Jurisdiction 
Indians historically have remained free of state court juris-
diction due to their sovereign relationship with the federal gov-
ernment.13 However, tension has developed between state and 
federal interests due to efforts by the states to exercise jurisdic-
tion over various aspects of Indian affairs.14 Water rights appur-
tenant to federal reservations have traditionally remained 
outside the jurisdiction of the states due to the sovereign immu-
nity of the United States.10 Until 1952 this immunity prevented 
states from exerting jurisdiction over Indian water rights claims. 
However, the McCarran Amendment,16 enacted in 1952, waived 
12. The State of Oregon intervened to assert its own rights as alleged owner of ap-
proximately 92,000 acres of former reservation lands as well as to support the claims of 
individual landowners asserting state based rights. 478 F. Supp. at 343. 
13. The most basic evidence of this relationship is contained in the Commerce 
Clause which authorizes Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations ... and 
with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3. The inapplicability of state laws to 
Indian affairs was first established by the Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Recent cases upholding that decision include United States v. 
Mazurie, 419 U.S.544 (1975), McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), 
and Williams v. Lee, 358 U.s. 217 (1959). See generally FELIX COHEN. HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, ch. 5, (1982) (hereinafter COHEN). 
14. "There has been recurring tension between federal and state law; state authori-
ties have not easily accepted the notion that federal law and federal courts must be 
deemed the controlling considerations in dealing with the Indians." Oneida Indian Na-
tion v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661. 678 (1974). See also Pelcyger, Indian Water 
Rights: Some Emerging Frontiers, 21 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 743, 745-51 (1976). 
15. It has also been argued that tribal sovereignty barred states from joining Indians 
in state court actions. According to this view, the McCarran Amendment waives only 
federal sovereign immunity thus having no effect on the ability of Indians to refuse state 
court jurisdiction over their water rights claim. However the courts have accepted the 
view that the United States, not the tribe, holds Indian water rights in trust. Colorado 
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). See text accompa-
nying note 18. 
16. 43 U.S.C. § 66 (1976) 
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in 
any suit. . . for the adjudication of rights to the use of water 
of a river system or other source, or ... for the administra-
tion of such rights, where it appears that the United States is 
the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by 
appropriation under State law, by purchase, exchange, or oth-
3
Crow: Indian Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985
154 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:151 
the sovereign immunity defense of the United States to state 
court jurisdiction in general stream adjudications. 17 
In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United 
States,!8 the Supreme Court considered whether the McCarran 
Amendment terminated federal jurisdiction over federal water 
rights, including Indian water rights. The Court held that the 
McCarran Amendment did not destroy federal court jurisdiction 
over water rights and emphasized the general obligation of fed-
eral courts to exercise their jurisdiction.19 However, dismissal of 
erwise, and the United States is a necessary party to the suit. 
The United States, when a party to such suit, shall ... be 
deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State laws 
are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable 
thereto by reason of its sovereignty .... 
Id. The legislative history of the McCarran Amendment indicates Congress did not in-
tend to address reserved water rights but only federal rights acquired pursuant to state 
law. The states were primarily concerned with facilitating adjudication of all water rights 
including those appurtenant to the vast federal landholdings in the West. Hearings 
Before Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S.18: A Bill To Authorize 
Suits Against the United States to Adjudicate and Administer Water Rights, 82d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5, 21-22, 46-48, 81, 90 (1951). The reserved rights doctrine was inter-
preted as limited to Indian reservations, thus posing no question of federally based water 
rights on other federal lands. Also, as of 1952 there had been only limited litigation of 
Winters rights and limited awards to Indians. See United States v. Walker River Irriga-
tion Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939). Despite the lack of Congressional intent to ad-
dress Indian water rights under the McCarran Amendment, the Supreme Court in Colo-
rado River held it applicable to adjudications of Indian rights. See text accompanying 
notes 18-36. 
17. A "general stream adjudication" refers to proceedings to determine the water 
rights of all users of a particular water source. Limited suits for determination of Indian 
rights are arguably not within the scope of the McCarran Amendment. 424 U.S. 800, 820 
n.26. See also Note, Adjudication of Indian Water Rights Under the McCarran Amend-
ment: Two Courts Are Better Than One, 71 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1023, 1024-27 (1983) 
(hereinafter, Adjudication of Indian Water Rights). 
18. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The United States, on its own behalf and that of certain 
Indian tribes, brought suit in federal court against 1000 water users in Water District 7 
in order to determine water rights based on both state and federal law, including re-
served rights. Id. at 805. Pursuant to the McCarran Amendment, one of the defendants 
attempted to join the United States in state court proceedings to adjudicate the same 
issue. The district court granted a motion to dismiss on grounds of abstention. The 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that abstention was inappropriate and 
that jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 which provides that "[e)xcept as other-
wise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or 
officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress." The Supreme Court re-
versed the Tenth Circuit and held that while abstention was inappropriate, dismissal of 
the suit from federal court was permissible. 
19. The Court described this duty as "the virtually unflagging obligation of the fed-
eral courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them." 424 U.S. at 817. 
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the federal action in favor of state proceedings was held proper 
for reasons of wise judicial administration.20 
The Court held that the policies behind the McCarran 
Amendment were the most important factor favoring dismis-
sal. 21 The major goal of the legislation was to avoid piecemeal 
adjudication of water rights.22 This federal policy led the Court 
to interpret the Amendment as allowing state court jurisdiction 
over Indian water claims. 
The Court also identified certain exceptional circumstances 
in Colorado River which permitted dismissal of the federal suit. 
If the federal forum was inconvenient for the litigants23 and 
there was a lack of progress in the federal suit, compared with 
the concurrent proceedings in state court,2' then the policies of 
the McCarran Amendment tipped the balance in favor of a state 
court adjudication.211 
In Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe,26 the Supreme 
20. [d. (citing Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. CoO-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 
(1952)). 
21. 424 U.S. at 819. 
22. [d. See supra note 16. 
23. The District Court was located in Denver, 300 miles from the state court. [d. at 
820. 
24. There were no proceedings in District Court beyond the filing of the complaint 
before the motion to dismiss was entered. [d. 
25. In addition the Court pointed to the government's participation in state court 
water rights proceedings in three other water districts in the state. The Court failed to 
note that none of those proceedings involved Indian water rights. Another factor was the 
extent to which state water rights were to be adjudicated in the federal suit. The Court 
implied that federal court was not the ideal forum for those determinations yet ex-
pressed no reservations about the ability of the state court to determine Indian water 
rights and other federal rights. [d. at 820. See supra note 14. 
26. 103 S.Ct. 3201 (1983). This was a consolidation of three Ninth Circuit cases de-
cided by the same panel within three days of each other: Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. 
Adsit, 668 F.2d 1080 (1982); San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 668 F.2d 1093 (1982) 
and Navajo Nation v. United States, 668 F.2d 1100 (1982). In each case either the United 
States in its capacity as trustee, or the Indian tribes acting on their own behalf, at-
tempted to have Indian water rights in Arizona or Montana decided in federal court. In 
each case, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Colorado River on its facts and reversed fed-
eral court dismissals made in favor of state court proceedings. In San Carlos and Navajo 
Nation, the Ninth Circuit held that due to disclaimers in the Enabling Act under which 
Arizona received statehood and the Arizona Constitution, the state could not assert juris-
diction over Indian water claims. 103 S.Ct. at 3209. See also Note, Northern Cheyenne 
Tribe v. Adsit: Are State Jurisdictional Disclaimers Still The Indian's Assurance of 
Federal Jurisdiction? 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 329 (1983). 
5
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Court applied the doctrine of Colorado River to another Indian 
water rights case.27 The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and 
held that the district court correctly deferred to the state court 
even though the case concerned federal reserved water rights. 
The issue concerned whether federal suits brought by Indians 
and involving only Indian water rights were subject to dismissal 
in favor of state court proceedings.28 
The Court concluded that, due to the policy of avoiding 
piecemeal litigation expressed in the McCarran Amendment, 
federal court deferral was proper even when the federal suit was 
filed by Indians for the limited purpose of determining Indian 
rights.29 The consolidation of proceedings at the state level fur-
thered the goal of judicial economy. According to the Court, con-
current federal proceedings were likely to be duplicative and 
wasteful. 80 The Court also emphasized that a race to the court-
house to control which forum would resolve the controversy 
should be avoided.81 
27. The Supreme Court had previously interpreted Colorado River in a case unre-
lated to Indian water rights. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construc-
tion Corp., 103 S.Ct. 927 (1983) the issue was the propriety of a district court decision to 
stay a federal suit brought under the Federal Arbitration Act out of deference to parallel 
state litigation. In holding that the district court abused its discretion in granting the 
stay, the Court emphasized that "the balance [is] heavily weighted in favor of the exer-
cise of jurisdiction." I d. at 937. 
28. 103 S.Ct. at 3212-13. Also at issue was whether the McCarran Amendment had 
any effect in states which were admitted to the Union subject to enabling acts in which 
Congress reserved absolute jurisdiction and control over Indian lands. Id. at 3210. Mon-
tana and Arizona were admitted under Acts which included such language. Enabling Act 
of Feb. 22, 1889, § 4, 25 Stat. 677 (including Montana) and Enabling Act of June 20, 
1910, § 20, 26 Stat. 569 (including Arizona). The Court held that since the purpose of the 
McCarran Amendment was to resolve a problem encountered by all states, federal sover-
eign immunity from state jurisdiction, Congress must have intended it to apply to all 
states. 103 S.Ct. at 3212. 
29. Id. at 3215. This reasoning means that in order to gain control over Indian water 
rights claims filed in federal court, a state could file a general water rights adjudication 
in state court post-dating the federal suit and the federal court would be obliged to de-
fer. The effect would be to prevent Indians from ever being able to litigate their rights in 
federal court. The majority recognized this possibility by noting several hypotheticals in 
which dismissal of the federal action would be inappropriate. Id. The fact pattern of 
Adair encompassed a number of elements from those scenarios. 
30. Id. at 3214. In his dissent, Justice Marshall notes that "exercise of federal juris-
diction here will not result in duplicative federal and state proceedings since the District 
Court need only determine the water rights of the tribes." Id. at 3216. 
31. Id. at 3214. The Court pointed out that the judgment of either court would ordi-
narily be res judicata in the other. 
6
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The Court characterized defense arguments in support of 
federal jurisdiction favorably32 but found the goal of judicial 
economy outweighed all other concerns.33 The potential inhos-
pitability of state proceedings to Indian claims,34 and the tradi-
tional freedom from state interference enjoyed by Indians31i were 
two concerns subordinated to the goal of judicial economy.36 
B. Water Rights 
Federal water rights derive from a separate doctrine than 
either the riparian rights system37 common in Eastern states or 
the prior appropriation system3S which governs the arid West. 39 . 
In Winters v. United States,'o the Supreme Court first enuni-
32. Id. at 3213. 
33. The majority emphasized the McCarran Amendment policies as determined in 
Colorado River rather than the "exceptional circumstances" test for justifying dismissal. 
That test had recently been upheld in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital. See supra 
note 27. 
34. In his dissent Justice Stevens cites a number of sources which support the view 
that the expectation of inhospitable treatment by state courts is well founded. 103 S.Ct. 
at 3219 n.8, (Stevens, J. dissenting). See Adjudication of Indian Water Rights, supra 
note 17, at 1053-54. 
35. See supra note 14. 
36. The dissent noted that since Indian reserved rights derive from a federal base, 
those rights would necessarily take priority over state created water rights. Therefore, 
separate adjudication of those federal rights would not necessarily be inefficient. 103 
S.Ct. at 3217-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens stated that, "the state court will incor-
porate these claims-like claims . . . that have been formally adjudicated in the 
past-into a single inclusive, binding decree for each water source." Id. at 3218. See also 
424 U.S. at 824 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
37. Under the riparian rights system the right to water is an incident of landowner-
ship which may not be forfeited by non-use or abandonment. The quantity is limited 
only by the necessity of sharing the same source with other landowners. In times of 
shortage, water is shared on a pro rata basis. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 51.1 (R. 
CLARK, ed., 1967) [hereinafter cited as CLARK.] 
38. To claim water rights under the doctrine of prior appropriation, one must have 
been the first to beneficially use and/or divert a specific quantity of water. The right can 
be forfeited by non-use or abandonment. When shortages occur, the earliest (senior) 
users receive their full appropriations while later Uunior) users receive what is left. 
CLARK, supra note 37, at § 51.9. The first judicial recognition of the doctrine occured in 
Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 190 (1855), in which the California Supreme Court held the 
riparian system inapplicable to the mining settlements of the West. 
39. There are exceptions to this doctrine because several Western states have a com-
bination of semi-arid and humid conditions. These states, including Oregon the site of 
Adair, have hybrid statutory systems in which both riparian and appropriation princi-
ples are applied. See CLARK supra note 37, at § 51. 
40. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). In this case, Montana had allowed private non-Indian land-
owners upstream from the Fort Belknap Reservation to appropriate and dam water from 
the Milk River under the state permit system. Heavy upstream use left inadequate sup-
plies for the agricultural needs of the Assiniboine Indians. 
7
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cated the doctrine of Indian reserved water rights. The Court 
held that the agreement41 establishing the reservation impliedly 
reserved the right to sufficient water to irrigate reservation 
lands.42 A priority date of 1888 was assigned to the right, making 
it superior to the rights of non-Indian users who acquired their 
rights pursuant to state law. 
By using the date of the agreement rather than the date of 
actual appropriation, the Court established the most significant 
element of the reserved water right. The rights were not based 
on actual use, but rather vested at the time lands were reserved 
for a particular purpose. This was an exception to the federal 
policy of recognizing state law as controlling water rights in non-
navigable streams.48 
The next issue adjudicated by the Supreme Court was 
whether individual Indian allotteesH and assignees4li had a right 
to any portion of the water rights reserved for irrigation. In 
United States v. Powers,46 the Court held that in order to fulfill 
the purpose of the reserved rights doctrine, the water must ben-
41. The Fort Belknap Reservation was established by agreement rather than treaty. 
25 Stat. 124 (1888). 
42. 207 U.S. at 576. According to the Court, the intention of the government in 
establishing the reservation was to convert the Indians from a "nomadic and uncivilized 
people" to a "pastoral and civilized people." [d. Agriculture was considered an integral 
part of this process, and thus the waters were reserved for irrigation purposes. 
43. Desert Lands Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C. § 321. Controversy surrounds the basis of 
the reserved rights doctrine. One view holds that the Indians reserved all rights not spe-
cifically granted to the United States in treaties, including the right to sufficient water to 
develop reservation lands. The other view holds that the United States in its capacity as 
trustor, reserved water for Indian reservations at the time the lands were reserved. 
Under the first view, Indian water rights are aboriginal and date from time immemorial. 
Under the second view the rights were created by the United States at the time the 
reservation was established. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. RESERVED 
WATER RIGHTS FOR FEDERAL AND INDIAN RESERVATIONS: A GROWING CONTROVERSY IN 
NEED OF RESOLUTION, 59 (1978). In Adair, the court examined the issue by separating the 
purposes for which water had been reserved. 723 F.2d at 1419. 
44. See supra note 8. 
45. By the time the allotment program ended in 1934 pursuant to the Indian Reor-
ganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1983), many Indians had sold or leased their allot-
ments. Questions arose as to the extent of water rights available to their Indian and non-
. Indian successors. 
46. 305 U.S. 527 (1939). The United States brought this suit on behalf of the Crow 
Indian Tribe in Montana. The government sought to stop all upstream diversion of 
water by non-Indian purchasers of Indian allotments. A drought from 1931-1934 so de-
pleted the water supply that the diversions by non-Indians left no water for a reservation 
irrigation project. 
8
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efit all tribal members equally.47 Indian allottees and assignees 
possessed a right to the reserved waters.48 The Court did not 
'quantify or define the precise nature of allottees' rights. Nor did 
the Court address the underlying issue which was the extent to 
which non-Indian successors to allotted lands could benefit from 
the reserved waters. 
In United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation District,49 the 
Ninth Circuit held that non-Indian successors possessed water 
rights equal to those of Indian allottees.lio This meant that non-
Indians became competitors with the Indians for unappropriated 
waters reserved to benefit Indians. The court reasoned that the 
Indians would benefit because their allotments could be sold or 
leased at a higher value with appurtenant water rights. iii 
In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Waltonli2 the Ninth Cir-
cuit denied the effectiveness of state water permits held by a 
non-Indian purchaser of Indian allotments.1i3 The non-Indian 
purchaser was only entitled to a right to water being used for 
irrigation at the time title passed plus water for land irrigated 
within a reasonable time after title passed.1i4 Also, unlike Indi-
ans, the court noted that non-Indian successors could lose the 
47. Id. at 532. The Court stated: "[U)nder the Treaty of 1888 waters within the 
Reservation were reserved for the equal benefit of tribal members." Id. 
48. Id. the Court also noted: "[W)hen allotments of land were duly made for exclu-
sive use and thereafter conveyed in fee, the right to use some portion of the tribal waters 
essential for cultivation passed to the owners." Id. 
49. 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956). The Yakima Tribe challenged the diversion by 
white settlers of water to which the Indians claimed reserved rights. In 1908, the Secre-
tary of Interior entered into an agreement with the settlers which granted them 75% of 
the water of Ahtanum Creek. At that time the Indians were only irrigating 1200 acres. 
The defendants argued that Indian water rights were limited to their actual beneficial 
use as of 1908 even though an irrigation project had quadrupled the irrigable acreage by 
1915. The court reluctantly held that the Secretary acted within his powers in making 
the agreement on behalf of the Indians. However, the court held that the Indians had a 
right to any water wasted or not used by the settlers. In United States v. Ahtanum Irri-
gation Dist. (Ahtanum II), 330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 381 U.S. 924 (1965), 
the court reneged on its conclusion as to the power of the Secretary to bargain away 
Indian rights and denied that particular issue had ever been presented to the court. 
50. 236 F.2d at 342. 
51. Id. 
52. 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). See infra note 
110. 
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right to reserved water through non-use.1I11 
The major issue concerning Indian reserved rights not re-
solved by the Winters decision was the quantification of water 
rights. In the years before the Supreme Court addressed the is-
sue, the Ninth Circuit held that the quantity reserved included 
water reasonably necessary for both present and future uses.1I6 
The principle that reserved rights must be flexible enough 
to include future increases necessary to accomplish the purposes 
of the reservation was upheld in Arizona u. California. 1I7 The Su-
preme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit view, stating that future 
reserved water rights for Indian reservations would be based on 
the total practicable irrigable acreage on the reservation.1I8 The 
court also noted that the doctrine of reserved rights applied to 
all federal reservations whether created by executive order, stat-
ute or treaty.1I9 
The development of the reserved rights doctrine has in-
cluded two significant water rights cases unrelated to Indian 
claims. These cases concerned land reserved by the federal gov-
ernment for purposes other than Indian reservations. In Cap-
paert u. United States,60 the Supreme Court held that the gov-
55. [d. 
56. Conrad Investment Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908). The United 
States sued a Montana irrigation corporation which was diverting water from a non-
navigable stream in which the Blackfeet Indian Reservation had reserved rights. Even 
though the diversion began before the Indians had exercised their rights and though the 
corporation had invested $500,000 in the irrigation project, the court held that the Indi-
ans were entitled to the entire flow. The court stated that "[w]hat amount of water will 
be required for these purposes may not be determined with absolute accuracy at this 
time, but the policy of the government [is to] reserve whatever water ... may be rea-
sonably necessary, not only for present uses but for future requirements." [d. at 832. 
[Emphasis added.] 
57. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). This case, heard under the original jurisdiction of the Court 
over controversies between states, was an adjudication of all water rights in the Upper 
Colorado River system. 
58. Id. at 600-01. "Practicably irrigable acreage" may include irrigation achieved 
with the use of modern technology. Report from Simon H. Rifkind, Special Master, to 
the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, 267 (Dec. 5, 1960). See COHEN, supra note 
13, at 589-90 for a discussion of the difficulties in determining "irrigable acreage." 
59. 373 U.S. at 601. All executive order and statutory reservations have implied res-
ervations of water. The method of determining the specific quantity depends upon the 
purpose of the reservation. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976). See text ac-
companying notes 60-65 infra. 
60. 426 U.S. 128 (1976). The issue was whether the reservation of Devil's Hole as a 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss1/9
1985] INDIAN LAW 161 
ernment's intent to reserve unappropriated waters could be 
inferred if the waters were necessary to accomplish the purposes 
for which the reservation was created.61 The Court held that 
preservation of a rare fish was a purpose of the Devil's Hole Na-
tional Monument and upheld a reservation of water sufficient to 
sustain them. 
In U.S. v. New Mexico,62 the Supreme Court refined Cap-
paert by holding that water may be impliedly reserved only for 
the primary purposes of a reservation.6s In setting aside the Gila 
National Forest, the government was held to have reserved suffi-
cient water for timber maintenance but not for aesthetic, recrea-
tional, or wildlife preservation purposes.64 The Court noted 
these purposes were only secondary ones on the reservation.61i 
In Kimball v. Callahan (Kimball 1),66 the Ninth Circuit 
held that the Klamath Termination Act did not abrogate the 
National Monument under the American Antiquities Preservation Act allowed an impli-
cation of federal reserved water rights in unappropriated water. The area was set aside in 
1952 by a Presidential Proclamation. The Cappaerts owned adjacent lands and, under a 
state permit, pumped out so much groundwater that a species of rare fish was endan-
gered. The National Park Service unsuccessfully protested the Cappaerts application for 
new permits from the state engineer. However, the district court issued a permanent 
injunction against pumping below the minimum level necessary for sustaining the fish. 
Upon affirmation by the higher courts, the reserved rights doctrine was extended to 
groundwater. 
61. Id. at 139. 
62. 438 U.S. 696 (1978). The issue before the Court was whether the reservation of 
land for the Gila National Forest carried with it reserved rights in the downstream flow 
of the Rio Mimbres River for recreation, aesthetics, wildlife preservation and stock wa-
tering. The case focused on congressional intent behind the acts creating the forest. 
Fairfax and Tarlock, No Water For the Woods: A Critical Analysis of United States u. 
New Mexico, 15 IDAHO L.R. 509, 524-525 (1979). 
63. 438 U.S. at 702. 
64. Id. Water for secondary purposes must be acquired pursuant to state law. 
65. Walton held that an Indian reservation could have dual purposes with implied 
reserved water rights to fulfill both purposes. 647 F.2d at 48. The court held that the 
primary purpose doctrine of United States u. New Mexico was inapplicable to Indians 
for three reasons: treaties and agreements frequently did not articulate the purposes of 
an Indian reservation; the implied purpose, to allow Indians to live in a self-sufficient 
manner on the reserved lands, must be liberally construed; and thirdly, most reserva-
tions were created for the benefit of the Indians, not for its own benefit as in other types 
of federal reservations. Id. 
66. 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974). This was an action for declaratory judgment for the 
purposes of deciding whether Oregon state fish and wildlife regulations applied to Indi-
ans exercising treaty rights. It is referred to as Kimball I to distinguish it from later 
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treaty rights of members who chose to withdraw from the 
Tribe.s7 The court interpreted the treaty to imply a right to 
hunt and trap as well as the specified right to fish. Members of 
the Tribe, including those who had withdrawn, retained their 
rights to hunt, fish and trap on former Indian lands.s8 
III. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. Jurisdiction 
In holding that federal court was the proper forum for In-
dian water claims, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the facts of 
Adair which differed significantly from both the Colorado River 
and San Carlos Apache Tribe decisions. Duplicative, wasteful 
litigation was not a potential problem in Adair because the only 
issues presented to the federal court were the priorities of fed-
eral water rights based on Indian claims.so The Ninth Circuit 
upheld the lower court's pre trial order declaring actual quantifi-
cation of the rights to be within the jurisdiction of the State of 
Oregon.70 In addition, the court held that the seven year delay in 
state proceedings had the effect of a stay, thus eliminating the 
danger of the federal court duplicating state proceedings.71 
The court also distinguished the secondary factors of the 
Colorado River test. In contrast to the infancy of the federal suit 
in Colorado River, the federal court in Adair had already consid-
ered and decided complex substantive issues of federal water 
rights. The court noted that the policy of judicial economy 
would be frustrated by requiring dismissal and a rehearing at 
67. See supra note 4. 
68. 493 F.2d at 566. This included federal forest lands and privately owned lands on 
which hunting and fishing was permitted. 
69. 723 F.2d at 1404. In Colorado River, the federal suit included determination of 
water rights acquired under state law. 
70. 723 F.2d at 1399 (citing the district court Pre Trial Order of November 14, 
1977). The Order declared that: 
[d. 
[A]ctual quantification of the rights to the use of waters of the 
Williamson River and its tributaries within the litigation area 
will be left for judicial determination consistent with the de-
cree in this action, by the State of Oregon under the provision 
of 43 U.S.C. § 666 [the McCarran Amendment]. 
71. The court pointedly noted that even at the time of appeal, seven years after the 
state administrative proceedings were initiated by the Water Resources Department, the 
state's preliminary investigation remained incomplete. [d. 
12
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the state level.'2 Additionally, the parties did not raise the issue 
of the inconvenience of the forum. 73 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the government's level of 
involvement in other Oregon state water proceedings met the 
government participation standard set out in Colorado River.74 
However, the court found that this one factor standing alone 
was insufficient to warrant dismissal. 
The Ninth Circuit noted that Colorado River did not hold 
that, pursuant to the McCarran Amendment, state courts had 
exclusive jurisdiction over Indian water claims.71i The absence of 
the exceptional circumstances requiring dismissal,78 combined 
with the limited nature of the federal proceedings, persuaded 
the Ninth Circuit to hold that the district court acted within its 
scope of discretion in exercising jurisdiction. 
B. Water Rights 
The Ninth Circuit upheld all of the lower court holdings on 
the substantive water rights of the parties except its decision not 
to separately declare the rights of the United States on former 
reservation lands that it owned.77 
The Ninth Circuit held that the Treaty of 1864 recognized 
dual purposes for the reservation and that the district court un-
necessarily determined primary and secondary purposes.78 The 
dual purposes were maintenance of traditional hunting, fishing 
and trapping activities as recognized in Kimball 1,79 as well as 
agricultural activities.80 Consistent with the Walton81 decision, 
the court found implied reservations of water sufficient to fulfill 
72. [d. at 1404. 
73. [d. at 1407 n.12. The district judge's offer to conduct the trial in Medford or 
Klamath Falls rather than Portland was ignored by the parties. [d. Distance between the 
federal forum and the litigants had no relevance in Adair. 
74. [d. See supra note 25. 
75. 723 F.2d at 1400. 
76. [d. at 1403. 
77. [d. at 1417·18. 
78. [d. at 1410. 
79. See text accompanying note 66. 
80. 723 F.2d at 1410. 
81. See supra note 65. 
13
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both purposes.82 
In establishing priority dates for the reserved water rights, 
the court noted that the Klamath Tribe's hunting and fishing 
rights did not originate with the Treaty of 1864 but rather were 
confirmed by it.83 Therefore the appropriate priority date for the 
water rights to support the rights of hunting and fishing was 
held to be time immemoria1.84 The date of the treaty was the 
proper priority date for waters reserved for agricultural purposes 
since this Tribe's activity did not predate the establishment of 
the reservation.811 
The Ninth Circuit clarified the lower court's holding regard-
ing the quantity of water necessary for hunting and fishing.8s 
The instream flow to which the Indians were entitled consisted 
of the amount needed to maintain a moderate living standard, 
not necessarily the original level of water.87 
Rejecting the argument that the Klamath Termination 
Act88 abrogated treaty water rights or subjected allottees to state 
water law, the court upheld the water rights granted to succes-
sors-in-interest of Indian allottees.89 The language of the Act di-
rectly contradicted the claim that reserved water rights for 
hunting and fishing ended with the termination of federal 
supervision.90 
82. 723 F.2d at 1410. 
83. [d. at 1414. 
84. [d. 
85. [d. 
86. "The Indians are still entitled to as much water on the Reservation lands as they 
need to protect their hunting and fishing rights." 478 F. Supp. at 345. 
87. 723 F.2d at 1414-15. The Ninth Circuit reiterated the "moderate living stan-
dard" set out by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 
(1979). The Court stated that "Indian treaty rights to a natural resource that once was 
thoroughly and exclusively exploited by the Indians secures so much as, but not more 
than, is necessary to provide the Indians with a livelihood that is to say, a moderate 
living." [d. at 686. An in-depth exploration of this standard is beyond the scope of this 
Note, but it is important to consider the limiting effect such a standard has on the quan-
tification of Indian water rights. 
88. 25 U.S.C. §§ 564-564w (1976). 
89. The General Allottment Act led to the elimination of 25% of the reservation 
land from tribal ownership. 723 F.2d at 1398. The majority of allotted lands shifted from 
Indian to non-Indian ownership at the end of the 25 year trust period. 
90. 25 U.S.C. § 564m (1976). "Nothing in [the Act) shall abrogate any water rights 
of the tribe and its members." [d. 
14
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The court concluded that without unequivocal action by 
Congress,91 an intent to abrogate treaty rights could not be im-
puted to the Act. To deny the implied reservation of water nec-
essary to support hunting and fishing rights, the court would 
have had to overrule Kimball 1.92 The court declined to under-
mine that holding by denying water rights to support the hunt-
ing and fishing rights which survived termination. 
The court also rejected the contention that the Termination 
Act ought to be interpreted to apply Oregon water laws to the 
Tribe immediately upon termination.93 The application of Ore-
gon law would have resulted in forfeiture of the Klamath Tribe's 
unappropriated reserved water rights.94 The court concluded 
this interpretation would directly contradict the stated intent of 
the Act to prevent abrogation of tribal water rights.96 
The Ninth Circuit also significantly modified that part of 
the district court opinion which held that the scope and priority 
of the government's water rights did not have to be determined 
because they were coterminous with the rights of the Klamath 
Indians.96 On appeal, the government claimed water rights from 
two sources. The court affirmed the rights which derived from 
the government's status as a successor-in-interest to the water 
rights appurtenant to Indian allotments.97 Thus, the government 
was entitled to sufficient water for all practicably irrigable acre-
age with a priority date of 1864.98 Because the marsh and forest 
91. "Once a tribe is determined to be a party to a treaty, its rights under that treaty 
may be lost only by unequivocal action of Congress." United States v. State of W88hing-
ton, 520 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 1975) cert. denied 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). 
92. 723 F.2d at 1411. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
93. The appellants focused on 25 U.S.C. § 564m: "[T]he laws of the State of Oregon 
with respect to abandonment of water rights by non-use shall not apply to the tribe and 
its members until fifteen years after the date of the proclamation [of termination]." The 
state and individual appellants contended that this section ought to be interpreted 88 
applying all Oregon water laws except those relating to abandonment and non-use to the 
Tribe immediately upon termination. 723 F.2d at 1416. 
94. The proper interpretation of that section applied Oregon water laws regarding 
abandonment by non-use to the Indians' rights beginning in 1976, fifteen years from the 
date the Termination Act became effective. [d. at 1416 n.26. 
95. [d. at 1416. The intent to abrogate treaty rights could not be imputed without 
explicit statements by Congress. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 
413 (1968). 
96. 723 F.2d at 1418. 
97. [d. 
98. [d. at 1419. 
15
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contained little irrigable acreage the government also sought to 
establish itself as successor-in-interest to reserved water rights. 
The government argued that the water it reserved for the pur-
poses of supporting Indian agriculture and to support Indian 
treaty rights ought to be available now for the purposes of a for-
est and wildlife refuge with the original priority date.99 Follow-
ing U.S. u. New Mexico, the court rejected this argument. To 
hold that water rights reserved for one purpose may be altered 
for a new purpose would be inconsistent with the Winters doc-
trine which states that rights which are an exception to state 
water law must be limited to the original purposes of the 
reservation. 100 
The Ninth Circuit also rejected any implication that the 
government would succeed to the water rights reserved for hunt-
ing and fishing by holding these treaty rights to be non-transfer-
able. lol Although the maintenance of a natural streamflow might 
inadvertently benefit the government's purposes, no right to the 
streamflow passed. l02 Finally, the court held that all the water 
rights appurtenant to former reservation lands had been estab-
lished. Since the government possessed irrigation rights with a 
priority date of 1864103 and the Indians had the hunting and 
fishing rights with a priority date of time immemorial,I°4 there 
were no other rights to be claimed by the government. 1011 
99. [d. The water to which the government was entitled could have been left in-
stream but "practicably irrigable acreage" would have still been the standard for quanti-
fying their rights. Special Master's Report, supra note 58, at 12. 
100. 723 F.2d at 1419, (citing United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700 
(1978». The government's argument in Adair, for a new purpose for reserved rights, is of 
interest to Indian tribes seeking to expand these rights to uses not contemplated at the 
time of reservation. Although the government lost, a tribe putting forth a similar argu-
ment for rights originally reserved for their benefit might achieve a different result. See 
S. Williams, The Winters Doctrine Under Attack published in INDIAN WATER IN THE 
AMERICAN WEST: A PLANNING AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE ((Conference and Reference Ma-
terial) American Indian Lawyer Training Program, (November 28-30, 1984)). 
101. 723 F.2d at 1419. 
102. [d. 
103. [d. at 1417. 
104. [d. at 1419. 
105. 723 F.2d at 1419. The court explicitly left the government two possible alterna-
tives for gaining water rights necessary to maintain the forest and wildlife refuge. First 
the government could claim an implied congressional reservation of water rights for the 
new purposes in the Klamath Termination Act. [d. The government did not put forth 
that argument in Adair. Secondly, if after quantification. the government's water rights 
proved inadequate, an appeal to Congress might be possible. In order to establish the 
Winema National Forest the government acquired non-reservation lands from the public 
16
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VI. CRITIQUE 
The only questionable holding in Adair involves the Ninth 
Circuit's reliance on Walton to allow non-Indian successors to 
Indian allotments a right to unappropriated reserved water 
rights. lOS This holding increases the alienability of the lands at 
the expense of the reserved rights doctrine and the policies of 
the General Allotment Act. l07 
The policies of the General Allotment Act and the reserved 
rights doctrine support the view that an allottee has only an ap-
propriative right during the trust period. At the end of that pe-
riod, when the allottee acquires title, the only appurtenant water 
rights are those acquired by appropriation. Consequently, the 
only rights the allottee could transfer would be based on the 
water actually in use at the time title passed. lOS 
Although it is true that the allottee would receive less 
money for land sold with an appropriative rather than reserved 
water right,109 this is not necessarily a "dimunition of Indian 
domain in 1893, 1906, 1907 and 1930. 478 F. Supp. at 347-48. The government could 
claim reserved water rights in those reservations of land. 723 F.2d at 1419. 
106. 723 F.2d at 1417. The court states that the Klamath Tribe's appeal on this 
issue is "foreclosed by our recent decision" in Walton without noting that the Walton 
decision relied in part on the district court decision in Adair. 647 F.2d at 51. The court 
utilized the lower court's reasoning that the "non-Indian purchaser, under no competi-
tive disadvantage vis-a-vis other water users may not retain the right to that quantity of 
water [the reserved right) despite non-use." Id. citing Adair, 478 F. Supp. at 348-49. In 
order to conclude that an Indian allottee may transfer a right to unappropriated reserved 
water the allottee must possess such a right. Walton relied on United States u. Powers 
to stand for the proposition that an allottee took an individual share of the tribe's re-
served water rights. United States u. Powers did not characterize the nature of an allot-
tee's right to reserved water other than to hold that it existed. -
107. See supra note 8 -for an explanation of the policies of the General Allottment 
Act. 
108. Isham, Coluille Confederated Tribes u. Walton: Indian Water Rights and Reg-
ulation in the Ninth Circuit, 43 MONT. L.R. 247, 259, (1982). 
109. Clearly, the lands become more valuable with a right to reserved waters in-
cluded. Despite the restriction on non-Indians as to loss of the right by non-use, the 
amount of water would still seem to be limited only by the irrigable acreage of the par-
cel. One commentator noted: 
[T)his would allow an aggressive non-Indian purchaser on an 
over appropriated stream, rights to place the entire parcel 
under irrigation even if the Indian grantor made no use what-
soever of the land. This creates incentives for prospective pur-
chasers of Indian allotments and an attractive inducement for 
allottees to sell. The rewards are as great for the idle as they 
are for the sellers who have shown great dedication to agricul-
17
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rights" which may not be allowed by implication. llo The Ninth 
Circuit, by persisting in this view, ignores two important points. 
The intent of the General Allotment Act was to encourage In-
dian agricultural activities. Under the court's view the sale price 
of the allottees' lands will never reflect the relative investment 
of the allottee in appropriating water during the trust period. 
The second point is that to allow non-Indians to share in tribal 
reserved water rights can be viewed as a dimunition of the rights 
of the entire tribe. 
By upholding the district court on this point, the Ninth Cir-
cuit ignores the irony of allowing non-Indians to utilize and 
compete for a resource reserved to benefit Indians. When the 
purpose for which the water was reserved is gone, as when In-
dian lands are sold to non-Indians, the reserved right ought to 
be extinguished. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Adair sets a clear standard for the cases which may be adju-
dicated in federal court when the state court has concurrent ju-
tural development and diligence. 
Getches, Water Rights on Indian Allotments, 26 S.D.L. REV. 405, 425 (1981). The man-
ner in which these suits arise make it clear that the addition of a right to reserved water 
is a windfall to non-Indian successors. For the most part, the allotments have already 
been alienated so any economic advantage will not accrue to the Indian sellers. 
110. Isham, supra note 108, citing Walton, 647 F.2d at 50. The Ninth Circuit held 
in Walton that it was a dimunition of rights and reversed the lower court's holding that 
the land ought to be sold with only an appropriative right. 
As this Note was going to press, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision on an appeal 
from the district court on the quantification of rights determined in Walton II. On the 
Tribe's appeal from an unreported district court opinion, the Ninth Circuit reversed and 
remanded for an opinion consistent with its own specific recalculations. Colville Confed-
erated Trives v. Waiton, No. 83-4285 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 1985). 
In recognition of the dangers alluded to in the text accompanying this note, the 
court emphasized that a very careful investigation had to be made into the degree of 
diligence used by non-Indian purchasers in perfecting inchoate rights. "Otherwise any 
remote purchaser could appropriate enough water to irrigate all irrigable acreage with a 
priority date as of the creation of the Reservation. The reasonable diligence requirement 
of Walton II would be meaningless." Id. 
In sharply criticizing the district court's disproportionate reduction in the water to 
be awarded the Tribe for its fishery, the Ninth Circuit stated that this failure to carry 
out the mandate of Walton II specifically granting sufficient water to the fishery was not 
excused by concerns about overallocation of the stream. "Where reserved rights are 
properly implied, they arise without regard to equities that may favor competing water 
users." Id. The proper solution was to award the Tribe its full allocation subject to pro 
rata reduction. 
18
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risdiction. Given the fact that Indian water rights claims can be 
resolved by a limited determination of federal priorities and that 
state proceedings are notoriously slow and frequently hostile, 
Adair will be an important tool for the tribes which choose to 
litigate. 
Margaret Crow* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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